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Introduction
The European Community (EC) has had difficulty in for-
mulating a comprehensive energy policy for a number of reasons.
Legally, the authority for such action by the EC is ambiguous.
The major treaty (the EEC treaty) that forms the basis for the
Community does not mention energy policy. While the two other
multilateral agreements (the ECSC and the Euratom treaties)
that complete the triad of constitutional documents creating the
Community deal specifically with coal and nuclear energy, their
limited substantive scope makes them inadequate for formulating
a comprehensive energy policy. Political problems add to the
legal/constitutional ones to inhibit a coordinated energy policy.
Energy issues have tended to touch the most sensitive political
nerves of national governments, both as to their domestic and
their foreign policies. At times, individual European states have
preferred an independent approach to international problems
such as dealings with OPEC. In areas such as acid rain, the
domestic interests of the Community members have conflicted
I The European Community or "Common Market" really consists of three com-
munities: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic
Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). Each of
these communities was created by treaty, the ECSC in 1951 by the Treaty of Paris, the
EEC and Euratom in 1957 by the Treaties of Rome.
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directly. Despite such obstacles, the Community has moved halt-
ingly toward the outlines of a common energy policy.
Although half-hearted attempts at formulation of a common
energy policy started as early as 1964,2 that movement was most
directly precipitated by the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979. Thus,
it is not surprising that the overriding goal of the developing
EC policy is the achievement of greater independence from Mid-
east oil and the political uncertainty related to dependence on
oil imports.3 A subordinate goal is to achieve independence at
the lowest cost possible. As the sense of crisis diminished after
each oil shock, the goal of independence became less important,
highlighting the inherent tension between security of supply and
short-term economic savings. The Community's attitude toward
coal supplies exemplifies this and other tensions and inconsisten-
cies within Community energy policy. Now that oil is relatively
inexpensive, the Community's commitment to shift to alternatives
such as coal seems to be wavering in word and in deed. Further-
more, because coal requirements would be met by imports, there
has always been the issue of substituting one international
dependency for another.
This article discusses the legal and political obstacles to Eu-
ropean Community energy policy coordination and the inherent
tensions that such a policy must face, especially in respect to
coal imports from the United States. The first half of the article
examines the institutions of the European Community in a gen-
eral overview. Where the structure or function of a particular
institution has some significant relevance to energy policy, es-
pecially to coal use, that relevance is noted. The second half of
the article examines specific areas of energy policy where the
activities of the EC or its member states affect the potential for
coal trade with the United States.
2 European Community debate over common energy policy occurred even prior to
1964. After discussions held throughout the late 1950's, however, the EC decided on
December 21, 1963 to commission a working group to study long-term energy prospects.
On April 10, 1964, the council adopted the protocol on Energy Problems, which concen-
trated on long-term coal development and supply. 7 O.J. EUR. COMM. 69 (1964); see COM-
MISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THIRTY YEARS OF COMMUNITY LAW 414 (The Euro-
pean Perspectives Series, 1981) [hereinafter cited as THIRTY YEARS OF COMMUNITY LAW].
I Evans, Shorter Articles and Notes: EEC Oil Policy, 17 J. OF WORLD TRADE
LAW 54 (1983).
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Three general routes exist by which the EC energy policy
could affect United States coal exports to Europe. First, some
policies increase or decrease the total amount of coal consumed
by Europeans. Examples of such policies are air pollution and
acid rain control, the promotion of nuclear energy, and fuel
efficiency guidelines.
Second, some EC policies increase or decrease the proportion
of such demand that is met by domestic European supplies. The
more demand met by such supplies, the less room for imports.
An example of one policy is the EC legislation allowing state
subsidies to local coal industries.
Third, some EC policies affect the competitiveness of Amer-
ican coal with other "third-country" coal available for European
import. Source diversification plans and policies promoting shared
technology or joint venturing might fit into this category. It is
probably true, however, that United States policies - for in-
stance, those affecting the strength of the dollar and the coal trans-
portation costs - are more determinative than EC policies in
regard to competition from other non-EC producers.
This article is also a guide for American decision makers. It
provides a description of the institutional context in which
energy policy is formulated in Western Europe, the substantive
nature of that policy, the inferred effects on the United States
coal industry, and the possible routes to affect European policy
in a positive way.
Part One: The Community and Its Energy Problem
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Energy has always been a fundamental concern to the Eu-
ropean Common Market. 4 At the end of the Second World War,
coal was still the primary energy source in Europe. Coal was of
crucial importance to the European economies, particularly as
an element in the production of steel. The formation of the
4 European Common Market, European Community and EC are used herein as
synonymous terms.
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European Coal and Steel Community in 19525 recognized the
importance of the coal industry in the movement toward Euro-
pean economic integration.
The European Coal and Steel Community was the precursor
of the European Common Market. Today it constitutes one of
the three communities of that common market. It was formed
as a product of the European unity movement which gathered
tremendous momentum at the end of the Second World War.
Numerous European statesmen of that era perceived that the
recent devastation suffered by their continent was largely attrib-
utable to economic competition. In particular, the competition
between continental Europe's two major powers, France and
Germany, especially in the coal and steel sector, had created
geopolitical tensions that escalated to unlimited war, involving
not only the entire continent, but much of the rest of the world.
6
One statesman, the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman,
proposed the formation of the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity as a first step toward European union.7 He recognized
that integrating France and Germany's coal and steel markets
would stimulate regional economic recovery and alleviate the
inefficient national market barriers that previously hurt the in-
dustry. Most importantly, integration would create a community
I The Treaty of Paris, which created the European Coal and Steel Community,
was concluded on April 18, 1951, and became effective on July 23, 1952. See K.
BORCHARDT, Tit ABCs OF COMMUNITY LAW 5 (European Documentation Periodical 2)
(1984).
, At the end of the Franco-Prussian War in 1871, the German nation took a
large section of Lorraine from France. As steel production expanded in the 1880's, iron
ore from Lorraine was used in steel mills located both in Lorraine and in the coal
producing Ruhr region. After World War I, the French recovered Alsace-Lorraine,
acquiring much of Germany's iron mines, blast furnaces and steel mills. As a consequence,
new steel plants were built in the Ruhr valley. These more modernized plants competed
with the older Lorraine plants for coke produced in the Ruhr. When Germany regained
tariff autonomy in 1925, the nation imposed duties on iron and steel from Lorraine.
Because such shifting of national boundaries and conflicts disturbed the natural economic
unity of this industrial region, many people sought to restore links between the Ruhr
and Lorraine after World War II. See W. DIEBOLD, JR., THE SCHUMAN PLAN: A STUDY
IN ECONOMIC COOPERATION 1950-1959 at 21-25 (1959); see also D. SWANN, ECONOMICS OF
THE COMMON MARKET 13 (2d ed. 1972); D. HENE, DECISION ON EUROPE: AN EXPLANATION
OF THE COMMON MARKET 1-15 (1979); A. SAMPSON, ANATOMY OF EUROPE 72-83 (1968).
DIEBOLD, supra note 6, at 21.
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of interest between France and Germany that would make an-
other military conflict between them impossible. By extending
this community to the rest of Europe, prosperity would be more
likely, war less likely, and a European union would be achieved.'
Realizing a goal, that of establishing a European union,
through a means as mundane as coordination of the coal and
steel industry might appear incongruous at first glance. However,
it was just such a mundane but fundamentally important area
that visionaries like Schuman perceived as fertile ground for
progress toward unity-much more so than the highly charged
political arenas, where proposals for immediate political union
(i.e., a United States of Europe) would receive sensational pub-
licity, but be doomed to failure.
The success of the ECSC in reviving the coal and steel
industries in post-war Western Europe and in promoting coop-
eration between the states involved led to the formation of the
European Atomic Energy Community and the European Eco-
nomic Community in 1958. 9 Like the ECSC, the European Atomic
Energy Community was a specialized organization aimed at co-
operation in only one area. The European Economic Commu-
nity, however, was a much more ambitious undertaking which
sought eventual full integration of the various European econ-
omies. In part, this meant creation of a "common market"-
an area of free trade where commodities, capital and labor could
move unimpeded by tariffs or similar barriers and where goods
from third countries could enter under restrictions common to
the entire market. 0 Such a common market has largely been
Id.
The Treaty of Rome, creating the European Economic Community and the
European Atomic Energy Community, was concluded on March 25, 1957, and entered
into force on January 1, 1958; see E. NOEL, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: How IT WORKS
78 (Commission of the European Communities, the European Perspectives Series, 1979)
[hereinafter cited as THE EC: How IT WORKS].
1o A common market is often defined as one stage in the development of an
economic union within a group of countries. A free trade area is first formed when a
group of countries eliminates restrictions on trade among themselves, although each
member country retains its own tariff and quota system on trade with third countries.
Free trade areas can cover all products or products in just one area such as industrial
products.
A group of countries can then form a customs union by setting up a common
tariff and quota system for trade with third countries in addition to eliminating restric-
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ENERGY POLICY
achieved." However, the Community is far from the total eco-
nomic integration envisioned in the Treaty of Rome. The lack
of a comprehensive common energy policy is one example of
this shortcoming-one which shall be examined later in this
article.
II. INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND PROCEDURE
The European Community is unique in the international
arena. It is not a sovereign state, but it is much more than just
another international organization. Essentially, it is a customs
union providing a tariff-free zone of trade for its members.
However, its powers go well beyond those normally possessed
by a customs union. On a broad range of subjects, including
energy and coal policies, it may create policy binding on its
member states and law binding on both the states and their
citizens." In this regard, the community has inherited that sov-
ereignty which historically was the exclusive attribute of its
constituent states. Such a phenomenon represents a very real,
albeit partial, step toward European union. The following sec-
tions examine what Community institutions are responsible for
exercising these powers and the means by which they do so.
tions on trade among themselves. A common market is a customs union in which all
restrictions on factors of production (labor, capital and enterprise) are eliminated.
Some authorities claim that the EEC is a fully realized common market which is
proceeding to the final stage of economic union. In an economic union, member states'
economies are fully integrated and supranational authorities make all economic policies.
An economic union is much more difficult to achieve than a free trade area, customs
union or common market, all of which result from the progressive elimination of
restrictions. This is because the economic union also requires states to transfer economic
sovereignty to new supranational institutions so that a single monetary system, central
bank and common foreign economic policy can be created.
See STEIN, HAY & WAELBROECK, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND INSTITUTIONS
IN PERSPECTIVE: TEXT, CASES & READINGS 364 (1976) [hereinafter cited as STEIN]. See
generally F. R. ROOT, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT THEORY AND POLICY
ENTERPRISE 378-79 (1973) (definition of a free trade area).
" A common market with no tariffs among countries and a common external
tariff has generally been achieved for goods. Such a common market, however, has not
been extended to services in financial, legal and other professional fields.
2 See, e.g., International Herald Tribune, June 29-30, 1985, at 1, col. 6; Inter-
national Herald Tribune, Aug. 2, 1985, at I, col. 8.
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A. Structure
1. The Commission
The Commission is the executive arm of the European Eco-
nomic Community. It is responsible for the enforcement of
Community rules and the administration of most Community
business. It is staffed by a large bureaucracy headquartered in
Brussels, Belgium. In addition to executive powers derived di-
rectly from the treaties establishing the Community (e.g., Com-
mission authority to enforce competition policy), numerous
powers have been assigned to the Commission by the Council,
mostly involving the adopting of rules by the Commission for
implementing Council decisions. The Commission is a rather
weak executive. Its ability to make independent policy decisions
and to speak for the Community is limited since the Council
has the final word on most major issues. However, much of the
Council's power to make law for the Community is contingent
on the Commission first submitting a proposal. This power of
initiative makes the Commission the moving force behind Com-
munity policy. The Commission has law-making powers of its
own under the ECSC treaty, subject to right of veto by Council
under certain circumstances. 3
The Commission is responsible for ensuring that Community
law, whether found in treaty or legislation, is properly imple-
mented. Where such law is infringed upon the Commission must
intervene, at times in a prosecutorial capacity and at times in an
adjudicatory one. If necessary, it may refer the matter to the
European Court of Justice.
4
The Commission's role is to serve the collective interests of
the Community exclusively. Its members are expected to repre-
sent community, not national interests. This contrasts with the
Council's role, discussed below. The Commission consists of
fourteen members. Although appointed by "common accord"' 5
of the governments of the member states, each of the smaller
'3 BORCHARDT, supra note 5, at 17.
14 Id.
11 Id. at 16-17.
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states has one of its citizens on the Commission, while France,
Germany, Great Britain, and Italy each have two. 16
2. The Council
The Council, composed of representatives of the govern-
ments of the member states, is the chief legislative authority of
the Community and the most powerful of its institutions. Such
power reflects, in part, the inability of the Community in recent
years to influence the sovereignty and individual interests of its
member states. Therefore, member states' interests are given
priority in the Council.
Although the Council is obliged to consider the goals and
needs of the Community as a whole, inaction (or weak action)
has often resulted from the collision of narrow interests within
that body. A Commission publication claims "The Council is
a Community institution and not a meeting place for govern-
ments. Consequently, it is not the lowest common denominator
between the Member States that is sought in the Council's delib-
erations, but the highest between the Community and the Mem-
ber States."' 7 Such sentiment may not reflect reality. In fact,
energy policy itself may be a prime example of minimal action
due to the inflexibility of individual national interest.
For the EEC and Euratom, the Council is the undisputed
supreme legislative body, and responsible for most important
policy decisions. Political power is more divided in the ECSC,
with the Council's role being more restricted to that of endorsing
or rejecting Commission decisions. 8
The shift in the two latter communities to greater relative
power for the Council at the expense of the Commission is
another example of individual sovereignty of the members as-
serting itself against the Community supranationalism which
reflected idealistic hopes for European union in the early 1950's
when the ECSC was formed. This shift clearly makes common
policymaking more difficult.
" Commission of the European Communities, European Community Facts and
Figures 7 (1974).
" BORCHARDT, supra note 5, at 17-18.
11 Id. at 21-31.
1985]
JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW AND POLICY [VOL. 1:173
The difficulty is heightened by the present voting practice in
the Council. While under the treaties most policy decisions in
Council are to be made by a weighted ("qualified") majority, a
French walkout in 1965 resulted in a revised practice.'
9 Under
the Luxembourg compromise of January 1966, all important
decisions, except budgetary ones, are made by a unanimous
vote.20 The constraints on policymaking are obvious. This voting
practice, combined with the vagueness of the legal mandate for
an EC energy policy, have served as obstacles to such a common
energy policy.2
3. The European Parliament
The European Parliament appropriately named itself in 1958.22
Although it aspires to be the legislature for Europe, it actually
has very little power outside of some budgetary authority .23 Real
legislative authority in the Community resides in the Council
and, to a limited degree, in the Commission. The Parliament is
consulted on proposed legislation but its opinions are only ad-
visory. It has the power to dismiss the Commission, but such
action is so extreme that its practical value is limited. Further-
more, there is nothing to prevent the member state governments
from reappointing a new Commission with the same composi-
tion. The Commission is obliged to report to Parliament an-
nually and to respond to questions posed on particular issues by
individual members.
24
,I Id. at 18.
2I Id.; see infra note 77 (for discussion of the compromise).
The addition of Spain and Portugal to the Common Market will aggravate such
difficulties in decisionmaking. See International Herald Tribune, July 9, 1985, at 1, col.
3.
22 Although the treaty refers to the Assembly, Assembly members renamed them-
selves in 1962. 5 O.J. EUR. COMM. 1045 (1962) (resolution of Mar. 20, 1962). The treaty
initially provided that the 198 Assembly representatives be selected from the national
parliaments of member states by their respective parliaments. See STEIN, supra note 10,
at 43. The revised name "European Parliament" has since become more appropriate.
On September 20, 1976, the European Council signed an act which introduced the
election of Parliament members by direct universal suffrage. See E. NOEL, WORKING
TOGETHER: THE INSTITTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 29 (The European Docu-
mentation Series, 1985) [hereinafter cited as WORKING TOGETHER].
STEIN, supra note 10, at 45-50.
22 Id. at 45.
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The members of the Parliament are now elected directly by
citizens of the member states. Symbolizing the supranational
nature of the body, members are organized and seated according
to party affiliation (Socialist, Christian Democrat, etc.) rather
than by national group.25
4. The European Court of Justice
The Court of Justice of the European Communities is the
final interpreter of Community law. Its holdings on issues of
Community law are binding on member states and their citizens.
In certain areas, it may have compulsory jurisdiction directly
over the parties and subject matter of a lawsuit. In other in-
stances, a question of Community law may be referred to it by
a national court, much like the certified question procedure in
this country. 26 By successfully insisting on the supremacy of
Community law and the binding nature of its interpretation
thereof, the Court has done much to further the cause of Eu-
ropean economic integration.
B. Institutional Procedure
Formulation of policy by the European Commission follows
consultations with political leaders, with government officials,
and with organizations representing workers and employers. Nu-
merous and lengthy meetings may be held. Weeks of detailed
consideration and negotiation may intervene between one reading
of a proposed measure before the Commission and the next.
Once the major policy lines have been agreed upon, the Com-
mission has access to the consultation of national experts to
work out the practical arrangements to be adopted or the pro-
posals to be submitted. 27 Of course, the question may be raised
whether these national experts serve more to facilitate Commu-
nity policy or to advance national interests, thereby frustrating
Community policy. In any event, Commission officials from the
relevant departments convene and chair meetings with these var-
25 NOEL, WORKING TOGETHER, supra note 22, at 29-30.
26 STEIN, supra note 10, at 134.
22 NOEL, THE EC: How IT WORKS, supra note 9, at 66; NOEL, WORKING TOGETHER,
supra note 22, at 39-41.
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ious national government experts who advise the Commission in
its search for a technical formula acceptable to the ten member
states. This procedure by which the Commission frames propos-
als to the Council is also the procedure by which it formulates
regulations or decisions that it could issue on its own, but which
it deems advisable to prepare with input from member states.
2
When it receives a general memorandum as a proposal on a
specific point from the Commission, the Council refers it to the
Permanent Representatives Committee. 29 The Committee's dis-
cussions are prepared by its various working committees. The
Commission is represented at all meetings of the Permanent
Representatives Committee so that dialogue begun with national
experts can continue with ambassadors and other government
representatives. 0 The Council's decisions must be made by the
ministers themselves; thus, important questions with political
implications are the subject of detailed discussion by the minis-
ters and the Commission members. Ministerial meetings are not
mere formalities (as might be suspected at such a high level),
but often involve extensive debate." At the risk of oversimpli-
28 NOEL, THE EC: How IT WORKS, supra note 9, at 67.
" The Committee of Permanent Representatives which works under the authority
of the Council plays an important role in the development of community legislation.
After devising an initial legislative proposal, the EC Commission gives the proposal to the
Council which decides whether the European Parliament or the Economic and Social
Committees need to be consulted. If so, the European Parliament can forward an
opinion to the Council and Commission. The Commission decides whether or not to make
amendments and sends amended versions to council. Amended proposals are discussed
at length in working groups or subgroups in the presence of commission officials. These
groups which form the lowest organizational level of council and are comprised of expert
civil servants from member states, attempt to reach consensus on the amended legislative
proposals.
The results of these working group discussions are passed on to the committee of
Permanent Representatives which tries to reach consensus on all remaining points at
issue. If an agreement is reached, the committee includes the amended proposal on thp
agenda for the next council session where the proposal would be adopted without further
discussion. If issues remain unsolved, the Permanent Representatives Committee will
either refer the proposal back to the working groups which can tackle technical diffi-
culties, or to Council, which would address unsolvable political questions and adopt
proposals which are successfully resolved. See STEIN, supra note 10, at 60-61; NOEL,
THE EC: How IT WORKS, supra note 9, at 68; OFFICE OF OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S LEGAL SYSTEM (European Doc-
umentation Periodical 5 (1984)).
STEIN, supra note 10, at 36-37.
, NOEL, THE EC: How IT WORKS, supra note 9, at 68 (1979).
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fying for the purpose of background understanding, the above
process can be viewed as one where the Commission proposes
and the Council disposes, with the final law-making power rest-
ing with the Council.
The main purpose of Community energy policy is the defin-
ing of objectives. Each year the Community reviews the energy
situation and tries to formulate policy. The objectives are not
rigid; the objectives are only indications or expressions of a
certain policy to be followed. The specific means of attaining
goals are left to the individual governments. For example, a
stated objective of producing a certain amount of coal means
that the EC shall introduce measures deemed necessary to cause
that quantity to be produced. If the EC intends to promote the
production of a certain amount of nuclear power, an objective
is formulated. Action is then supposed to be taken at both the
national and Community levels to reach that objective. These
actions are reviewed annually to see if progress is consistent with
stated goals.32
III. THE LEGAL BASIS FOR COMMUNITY ENERGY POLICY
As noted earlier, the European Community consists of three
originally distinct legal entities: The European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC),
and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). Each
entity exists by virtue of international agreement among member
states. The ECSC treaty (Treaty of Paris) was signed in 1951.
The EEC and Euratom treaties (Treaties of Rome) were signed
in 1957. Although a merger agreement was instituted in 196533
to combine the administrative functions of the three communi-
ties, their substantive powers are still governed by the terms of
the individual treaties.3 4 Unlike other treaty policies such as
agriculture and transportation, general energy policy has no
:2 Brondel, Energy Policy and the EEC, 6 ENERGY POL'Y 232 (1978).
" The merger agreement was instituted on Apr. 8, 1965. NOEL, THE EC: How IT
WORKS, supra note 9, at 83; see also, THIRTY YEARS OF COMMUNITY LAW, supra note
2, at 1-3.
, The EC treaties are unique because they are the only international treaties in
which sovereign nation states delegate to supranational authority the right to make
policies in certain areas on behalf of the nation states.
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specific treaty provisions devoted to its formulation.35 At the
time of treaty formulation, more than a decade before the first
hint of an energy crisis, energy was not identified as an area
requiring common action. Initially, the ECSC dealt with coal, while
Euratom dealt with nuclear power. All other forms of energy
came under the generic provisions of the EEC treaty. Given this
inherent split in substantive responsibility, it was very difficult
to progress toward a common energy policy prior to the admin-
istrative merger of the communities in 1967.36
One of the most common legal bases for Community energy
policy is EEC Article 103.1 7 This provision requires member
states to regard their conjunctural policies (short-term economic
measures designed to meet certain crises) "as a matter of com-
mon concern." 38 Article 103(2) empowers the Council, acting
unanimously on a Commission proposal, to decide on measures
appropriate to the crisis being dealt with under this article.3 9
Article 103(3) permits the Council, on a qualified majority after
a Commission proposal, to issue directives necessary to give
effect to measures decided upon under Article 103(2). 40 Article
103(4) triggers the previous provisions when difficulties arise "in
the supply of certain products" .41 As a result of the Arab oil
embargo of 1973, Community energy measures have concen-
trated on avoiding just such disruptions of supply by another
energy crisis. To this extent the EC energy strategy is crisis
oriented and legally supported by Article 103.
43
Certain aspects of the Community's energy policy focus on
information gathering. EEC Article 213 gives the Commission
the power to "collect any information and carry out checks
" Green, The Implementation of Treaty Policies: The Energy Dilemma, 8 EUR.
L. REV. 186 (1983).
16 G. PARKER & B. PARKER, A DICTIONARY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 21
(1981) [hereinafter cited as EC DICTIONARY].
" See, e.g., Green, The Legal Basis of a Community Energy Policy, 8 EUR. L.






Id. at 53-54 (crisis language noted in O.J. EUR. COMM. (L 308) 14 (1968) Council
Directive 68/414/EEC and O.J. EUR. COMM. (L 228) 1 (1973) Council Directive
73/238/EEC).
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required for the performance of the tasks entrusted to it. ""The
Council can set conditions that limit the Commission's power
under this Article. The extent to which the Council may use
Article 213 as the legal foundation for legislation is unclear,
because the article is silent on the issue of legislative competence.
However, the Council has issued measures under Article 213
requiring states and private organizations to provide the Com-
mission with various types of information.
45
As mentioned, none of the Community's constituent treaties
make any explicit reference to a common energy policy. How-
ever, EEC Article 235 provides that the Commission may make
proposals not specifically provided for in the treaty.4 6 Most
Community energy policy measures have been formulated under
this article, which is probably the most convincing legal basis
for energy policy legislation. The Article permits Community
action where the treaty has not otherwise provided the necessary
powers and where such action is necessary to attain "one of the
objectives of the Community. ' 47 A significant limitation on
action under this Article is that proposals must be unanimously
adopted by the Council. This requirement has caused many
proposals with majority support to stall under Council consid-
eration.
4 8
There are other provisions in the Community treaties under
which action relevant to energy matters can be taken. Examples
are competition rules, state aids, and the common customs tariff.
Legal authority is clear in such areas, stemming from express
provisions. However, the narrow substantive scope of such pro-
4' Treaty of Rome, 1957 art. 213. One authoritative source on community law
says the following concerning the somewhat opaque term "conjunctural policy": "[Tihis
is a literal translation of the term used in the original texts. In English such terms as
'policy on current trends,' 'short-term economic policy' and 'cyclical policy' are also
commonly used." SWEET & MAXWELL, B III Encyclopedia of European Community
B 10091.
,1 Green, supra note 37, at 55-56.
Id. at 56.
47 Objectives are defined as harmonious development of economic activities
throughout the community, a continuous balanced expansion and an increase in stability.
ld.
I 4 Letter from J. C. Guibal, Director-General for Energy, Commission of the Eu-
ropean Communities, to Sarah Stump (July 3, 1984).
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visions make them ineffective for implementing a general energy
policy.
49
Finally, EEC Article 5 requires member states to "ensure
the fulfillment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or
resulting from actions taken by the Institutions of the Commu-
nity." 50 Implementation of energy policy objectives is largely
determined by member states. Each is required to harmonize its
energy policies with the mandates of Community policy. Each
reports at frequent intervals on the progress it has made toward
achievement of Community objectives." These requirements are
effected by Article 169 of the EEC Treaty, which contains en-
forcement procedures concerning non-compliance by a state with
treaty obligations.5 2 Thus, if the Commission considers a member
state to be breaching its obligations in regard to energy policy,
the former "shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter after
giving the state concerned the opportunity to submit its obser-
vations."" a If the member state does not comply with the Com-
mission's opinion within a specified time, the Commission may
bring the matter before the European Court of Justice.
5 4
IV. THE 1973 ARAB OIL EMBARGO
The European Community is the largest oil importer in the
world.55 This vulnerability was made clear in the wake of the 1973
Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur War. When the Arab oil producers who
dominated OPEC 6 declared a boycott against Western nations
Green, supra note 37, at 55-56.
5o Id. at 55.
s' THIRTY YEARS OF COMMUNITY LAW, supra note 2, at 424.
Treaty of Rome, 1957 art. 169.
53 Id.
14 EC DICTIONARY, supra note 36, at 25.
11 H. MAULL, EUROPE AND WORLD ENERGY 77 (1980).
16 OPEC, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, was formed in 1960
by the countries Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. By 1973, OPEC's
members included Qatar, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Nigeria, Indonesia and Abu Dhabi.
Members of OPEC in North Africa and the Middle East include Libya and Algeria and
the Persian Gulf states of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Abu Dhabi.
OAPEC, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, was found in 1968
and is comprised of the nations, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Kuwait, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Qatar,
Bahrain, Abu Dhabi and Algeria. THE ENERGY QUESTION: AN INTERNATIONAL FAILURE
OF POLICY 44, 57, 59 (E. Erickson & L. Waverman ed. 1974).
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purportedly aiding or sympathizing with Israel, Europe experi-
enced a devastating shock. The United States was inconveni-
enced, at the very least. With its relatively large domestic and
western hemisphere energy supplies, the United States was not
faced with the spectre of economic disaster as was Europe.
Coal was noticeably absent in the 1973-74 energy crisis. This
absence was particularly prominent in light of the dominant role
coal had played in the European energy sector little more than
a decade before. When discussing the failure of EC energy policy
during the 1973-74 oil crisis, one author cites politicization of such
policy as a principal cause for the failure. Linking this to the de-
cline of coal in Europe, he writes "The causes of this politici-
zation are not difficult to identify. They lie in a combination of
long-term trends involving the change from an economy based on
domestic coal to one based on imported oil, and in the crisis events
of the October War with its attendant oil embargo, supply fears,
and fourfold rise in oil prices."
'5 7
To understand the relationship between the decline of coal
and the EC's failure to adequately deal with the energy crisis of
1973-74, some additional history is necessary. Between 1960 and
1970, the relative positions of coal (overwhelmingly domestic)
and oil (overwhelming imported from the Mideast) in meeting
Europe's primary energy requirements reversed themselves, with
oil rising from about 33% to 600o and coal falling from 61%
to 29%.58 This decline of coal can be partially attributed to the
failure of coal to meet basic goals of economic integration
implicit in the community. Not only was there no common
energy policy, but the lack of a common external tariff on coal
and other energy imports meant that there was not a true com-
mon market.5 9 Prior to 1970, imported Mideast oil was signifi-
cantly less costly than European (or even American) coal. 6° Thus,
those EC nations that chose to protect their local coal industries
by placing tariffs on cheap imported energy placed their own
manufacturing industries at a competitive disadvantage. Their
" R. Lieber, Oil and the Middle East War: Europe in the Energy Crisis, 35 HARV.
STUD. INT'L AFF. 1, 46 (1976).
" Id.
,9 See supra notes 10 and II (providing more information on Germany's separate
coal tariff and why it is not subject to common tariff rule).
60 Lieber, supra note 57, at 4.
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higher energy costs were reflected in higher production costs, a
phenomenon attributable to lack of a common coal tariff. This
situation could not last. European manufacturers made increas-
ing use of imported oil. Thus, by not providing for a common
tariff on imported energy, the ECSC treaty "helped to insure
the decline of the European coal industry and the movement of
Europe from a coal-based to an oil-based energy economy.' '6,
Given the special role that coal has played in the movement
toward European integration by being a subject of the first
Community treaty, it is remarkable that it is less well protected
than many other goods which are shielded by common external
tariffs which were imposed pursuant to the EEC treaty. This
situation is one of the effects of having a separate treaty for
coal. During the 1960's, some Community efforts were made to
halt or slow the decline of coal. Those involved in such attempts
predicted the very kind of vulnerability to oil supply and price
problems that was later to haunt Europe. But there was little
tangible result to come of it. 62 The ECSC did adopt a "Protocol
of Agreement" on energy policy in 1964.63 However, the docu-
ment was more politically palatable than practical, calling for
security of supply and low prices for consumers. It did nothing
to provide the kind of substantial Community subsidy for coal
that was provided for agricultural goods. While individual na-
tional subsidies were eventually permitted, they were less effec-
tive than the agricultural subsidies because of their piecemeal
nature, smaller scale and delayed implementation.6 An Arab oil
embargo following the Six-Day War of 1967 was a total failure
due to the abundant alternative supplies in the market. However,
this abortive attempt should have put Europe on notice that, in
different market conditions, it could be extremely vulnerable to
economic warfare where oil was the weapon. Nonetheless, no
significant EC crisis planning, let alone a comprehensive energy
policy, had emerged by the time the Yom Kippur War broke
out six years later. The discussions continued. The warnings about
' d. at 3.
I ld. at 4.
I d.
Id.
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the impending energy crunch continued."' The reports about the
need for a policy ensuring plentiful energy supplies continued."
But no policy was formed. The only concrete accomplishment was
a stockpile requirement-originally 65 days, raised to 90 days-
for crude oil and petroleum products.67 Whe the first oil crisis
struck in fall 1973, the Community was not well prepared for it.
Shortly after the Arabs announced their boycott in Novem-
ber, 1973, the Dutch government threatened to cut off supplies
of cooking gas to Parisian kitchens if the French government
continued to cooperate with the Arab oil embargo against its
Dutch EC partner. Contrasting the roles played by France and
the Netherlands after the Arabs instituted their 1973 oil embargo
depicts the inability of the Community to react to the embargo
on a unified basis.
68
11 In October 1972, the Commission submitted a lengthy memorandum on energy
policy which contained forecasts and policy recommendations for the period ending in
1985. The memorandum projected that oil supplies would be threatened by widespread
interruptions and advised that long term security replace temporary price advantages as
a policy priority. The Commission recommended that 90-day stockpiles be established in
Europe and that negotiations begin with the United States and Japan to improve OECD
procedures on information and stockpiling. The Commission also recommended that agree-
ments be made to promote economic and social development of oil-producing nations
in exchange for guarantees on exports of oil to the EC. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES, NECESSARY PROGRESS IN COMMUNITY ENERGY POLICY 15 (Bulletin of the
European Communities, Supp. 11/72) (communication from the Commission to the Council
forwarded to Oct. 13, 1972); see also Lieber, supra note 57, at 6-7.
66 The Commission published "Guidelines and Priorities for a Community Energy
Policy" in April 1973. The guidelines recommended the development of local energy
sources, increases in the use of coal, decreases in projected oil imports, development of
relations between Europe and producers, cooperation with U.S. and Japan to avoid
overbidding by oil-importing nations, and the establishment of an OECD energy con-
sulting group.
Europe's options and failures in dealing with the energy crisis a year later can be
measured by these commission targets. For example, in May 1973, the Council of
Ministers could not reach any agreement on consumer collaboration of emergency energy
sharing. In another instance, the French vetoed any talks with the U.S. and OECD,
arguing that Europe had not reached agreement on their own policies and talks should
therefore be conducted by governments rather than by the Commission.
See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMuNITIEs, GUIDELINES AND PRIORITY ACTIONS
UNDER THE COMMUNITY ENERGY POLICY 5 (Bulletin of the European Communities, Supp.
6/73) (communication from the Commission to the Council, Apr. 27, 1973); see also Lieber,
supra note 57, at 7.
17 15 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 291) 154 (1972) (Council Directive of Dec. 19, 1972,
Amending Council Directive 68/414/EEC).
See, e.g., The Economist, Nov. 24, 1973, at 63; N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1973, at
9, col. 1-8.
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The Dutch, along with the Americans, were designated by
the Arabs as "unfriendly" to their cause and therefore were
made the objects of an attempted total boycott. No Arab oil
was to go to the Netherlands. The French, on the other hand,
who had been pro-Arab for years and highly critical of Israel,
were classified as "friendly," entitling them to their entire pre-
embargo allotment of Arab oil.69 It is important to keep in mind
this anathema to the notion of a common market. Free move-
ment of goods between members is one of the first principles of
such an entity. Yet the Arab boycott could not be enforced
unless nations like France, which continued to receive Arab oil,
refused to allow its free movement to boycotted EC partners
like the Netherlands. Incredibly (at least in light of the philo-
sophical and economic underpinnings of the European Com-
munity), the French went along with the Arabs. The Dutch
dampened such willingness when, as the major supplier of nat-
ural gas to Northern France, they indicated that they would be
forced to cut off such supplies if their own supplies of oil were sig-
nificantly reduced by the boycott. The Dutch warning extended to
its other EC partners receiving large amounts of natural gas
from the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium. Nonetheless, the
attitude of sauve qui peut (every man for himself) characterized
French behavior throughout the energy crisis. While a few coun-
tries like the Netherlands called for a more unified EC front,
the French approach of an individual national response seemed
to be more characteristic of the initial reactions of most com-
munity members. Another example of French sauve qui peut
was its lone refusal to enter into any serious cooperation within
the context of the Atlantic alliance to present a common front
regarding the energy supply threat. It preferred to strike separatp
supply deals with individual Arab producers and to promote
within the EC a special long-term relationship with the Arab
states. 70 Thus, when the Western industrialized nations of the
" See, e.g., The Economist, Nov. 24, 1973, at 63; see also Lieber, supra note 57,
at 12-13.
70 The French, fearing that they might jeopardize Arab ties, rejected Dutch requests
to share supplies with the Netherlands in the event of a boycott. EC Minister Messner
declared that a common energy policy would have to be a precondition for such sharing.
See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1973, at 61, col. 8; see also, Lieber, supra note 57, at
14-15.
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OECD created the International Energy Agency (lEA) in No-
vember, 1974, France refused to join.7' It wanted to avoid the
perception, both domestically and in the eyes of the Arabs, that
it was following what it perceived as the confrontational and
anti-Arab lead of the United States.7 2 The most significant con-
crete achievement accompanying the formation of the IEA was
its supply sharing agreement for periods of critical shortage.
73
The EC had failed to legislate this form of arrangement as an
element of its then nonexistent, but oft-proposed energy policy.
Since 1974, as the following sections of this article discuss,
the Community developed at least the beginnings of an energy
policy due to the experience 1973-74. The broad targets of that
policy in terms of reducing dependence on imported oil have
been met, despite the fact that the policy lacks any enforceabil-
ity. Therefore, the question is whether Europe has improved its
energy situation due to EC policy or whether Europe has im-
proved its energy situation totally irrespective of the EC.
74
7, Although France remained outside the lEA, all eight of its EC partners became
members. France, therefore, was able to benefit from lEA actions by virtue of its
association with the rest of the EC members. See Lieber, supra note 57, at 38.
72 In the end, France did not benefit all that greatly from its go-it-alone tactics.
The multinational oil companies found themselves in the unlikely costumes of white
knights. Faced with the necessity of allocating the international oil supplies in their
control, they did so on a pro-rata basis undercutting Arab attempts to isolate and punish
least favored nations and French attempts to avoid sharing in the cutbacks. See Lieber,
supra note 57, at 16-17.
11 This IEA supply sharing agreement provided that when one or more members
suffered supply cuts of 7% or more of its previous year's oil consumption, then all
members would be obliged to reduce their own oil consumption by 706 and cooperate
to reallocate available oil imports. This particular sharing formula would apply auto-
matically at a 7% shortfall unless the action would be blocked by a weighted 60%
majority vote of IEA members. For a country's 12% consumption loss, other countries
would reduce consumption by 10% as well as use some reserve oil stocks. For losses in
consumption that exceed 12%, the other member countries would devise measures to
further restrain demand. See Lieber, supra note 57, at 38-39.
" See Lieber, supra note 57, at 1, 44. While Lieber finds the Community to have
failed to react effectively to the 1973-74 oil crisis, such a conclusion may be overdrawn.
While it is true that the community was unable to formulate a unified short term
response to the crisis, the oil embargo did prompt the community to articulate energy
objectives for the future which have largely been met. The underlying goal of those
objections, greater independence of OPEC oil, has been achieved. So have the means
to that goal of supply diversification, increased energy efficiency, and decreased demand
relative to economic output. Thus, it could be argued that Lieber's finding of policy
failure might be true for the short term reaction to the oil crisis, but not for the long
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Part Two: Law & Policy Responses & Their
Impact on United States Coal
I. COMMUNITY ENERGY LEGISLATION
While no comprehensive common energy policy exists for
the European Community, there does exist much Community
legislation in the energy area. Taken collectively, this legislation
does not mandate any uniform practice on consumption, pro-
duction, fuel selection, or any other major issue of energy policy.
The legislation reflects the general consensus, felt within the
Community for over a decade, that less dependence on Mideast
oil is a necessity. It also reflects the lack of consensus on what
kind of coordinated policy, if any, is needed to lessen such
dependence. Certainly the dependence has decreased from Oc-
tober, 1973. To what extent that reflects any success of Com-
munity efforts related to energy and to what extent it reflects
market conditions that have improved (temporarily or perma-




Some of the reasons for the absence of a truly comprehensive
energy policy have been discussed earlier in this article. Most of
these reasons relate to the basic conflict between national pre-
rogative and collective Community authority. Constitutionally,
the Community lacks comprehensive authority in the energy
area, with only limited specific grants of power in the nuclear
and coal industries pursuant to the Euratom and ECSC treaties.
Thus, the Community must rely on the "catch-all" Article 235
of the EEC Treaty as the basis for its general energy policy.76
term. On the other hand, any finding of long term success for community energy policy
must be qualified to the extent such success was in no way related to EC actions, but
solely 'the result of national decisions or other external circumstances.
" See generally note 79 infra and accompanying text.
16 Article 235 of the EEC treaty authorizes Council to take "appropriate meas-
ures" if action by the community is necessary to attain an objective of the community
and the treaty has not otherwise provided the necessary power. Council must act
unanimously on a proposal from the commission and must also consult the Assembly:
If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course
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However, Article 235 can be acted upon only by a unanimous
vote of the Council, where the ministers represent their individ-
ual governments." The difficulty in reaching agreement in such
matters will be increased with the entry of two more countries,
Spain and Portugal, into the Community. Two more votes on
the Council may mean two more potential vetoes of ,any pro-
posed energy legislation.
If certain energy interests of two of the most important EC
members - Britain and France - are compared, concrete illus-
trations can be made of the difficulty in reaching a consensus.
Of all the EC nations, Britain has an abundance of energy
resources. It is the only one of the ten which is a net exporter
of energy. In addition to its substantial coal reserves, large
amounts of oil are produced from its North Sea fields. Britain
is not anxious for control of that wealth to pass from its national
authority to that of the Community. Thus, any European Com-
munity attempt at legislation that mandates price, production
levels, or distribution rules for energy (even in time of crisis)
almost certainly would be blocked by Britain.
France is no more of a team player than Britain when it
comes to the development of a common EC energy strategy.
France maintained an independent attitude during the 1973 Arab
Oil embargo, and since that time has invested much national
effort and capital in its nuclear program. It chose to develop
that program, not as a cooperative European venture through
Euratom, but as an independent entity. France is unlikely to
allow its nuclear program to be subjected to the constraints of
of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the
Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the
Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the commission and
after consulting the Assembly, take the appropriate measures.
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, signed in Rome on March 25,
1957, Article 235. See also TifiRTY YEARS OF COMMUNITY LAW, supra note 2, at 50-62.
17 Even if energy policy did not fall under the Article 235 unanimity requirement,
many policies would still be required to be made with unanimity according to the
Luxembourg voting Compromise of 1965. The Luxembourg agreement redefined the
commission's role and extended the, unanimity requirement in Council beyond treaty
provisions in response to a French boycott of all policy making meetings of community
bodies for seven months in 1965. According to the compromise, discussions on issues
which are fundamental national interests must continue until a unanimous agreement is
met. See STEIN, supra note 10, at 63-66.
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a collective EC energy policy. A true common market for energy
would require the free flow of energy produced in one EC nation
to another member state with no price discrimination. The French,
however, plan to sell neighboring Europeans surplus electricity
produced by its nuclear reactors at higher prices than in its
domestic market.
Britain and France are not alone in their willingness to
protect their self-interest in energy matters. Germany's coal and
the Netherland's natural gas undoubtedly raise similar national
sentiment. These cases merely illustrate the difficulty in forming
a Community policy by unanimity.
B. General Aims
No comprehensive common energy policy has been formu-
lated by the EC in the sense of obligatory legislation that man-
dates fuel choice, production figures, prices, and sharing
arrangements. However, that is not to say that there is no EC
energy policy at all. As incomplete as it may be, such a policy
does exist. Its boundaries are imprecise, owing largely to the
present stage of European federalism, with national policy either
following or leading Community policy, depending on the ob-
server's perception. A small area of authority does indeed exist,
manifested by a small number of mandatory regulations and
directives, surrounded by a larger region of moral persuasion
and voluntary concerted behavior expressed in general resolu-
tions and some specific targets.
The underlying goal of virtually all EC energy policy became
apparent only after the first "oil shock" of 1973. The cited goal
is reduced dependence on foreign, especially Mideast oil. Im-
plicitly, the EC wants freedom from its vulnerability to political
and economic pressure imposed by these oil producers.
A Council Resolution of December 17, 1974 "concerning
community energy policy objectives for 1985" was the first EC
act to enunciate general objectives and to set specific targets for
energy policy. 78 The very first objective listed was the reduction
11 17 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 153) 2 (1974) (Council Resolution of Dec. 17, 1974
concerning Community energy policy objectives for 1985).
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of dependence on imported energy. The objectives included re-
ducing energy consumption, fuel switching, maintaining EC coal
production, increasing coal imports, increasing EC and imported
natural gas supplies, increasing EC oil production, and encour-
aging research and development related to use of old and new
energy sources. The tension between the goal of increasing coal
imports and other stated aims can be observed. It is apparent
that reduction of dependence on imported energy and maintain-
ing domestic coal production could not be taken as unyielding
imperatives, if increased coal imports were also desired.
There was nothing obligatory in any of these objectives. The
very form of this Council action, a "resolution," highlights its
non-binding character. The Treaties do not mention "resolu-
tion" in describing the various legislative enactments available
for Council use. 79 The only hint of enforcement action is found
in the last paragraph of the resolution, which requests that the
commission submit proposals for the implementation of this
Resolution. However, despite the non-binding nature of these
objectives, progress has been made on virtually all of them.
While much of that progress is attributable to national or inter-
national circumstances unrelated to EC efforts, one would sus-
pect that EC actions had some impact.
C. Enactments of the Council and the Commission
The specific enactments by the Council and the Commission
that have sought to implement the objectives outlined by the
Council on 17 December, 1974, have not taken the form of rules
mandating or prohibiting particular sectoral activity. More often
they have articulated targets or established monitoring proce-
'9 Article 189 of the EEC Treaty, Article 161 of the Euratom Treaty, and Article
14 of the ECSC Treaty authorize Council to enact various types of legislation. A
regulation or an ECSC decision is a legal act which is binding in its entirety and which
is generally and directly applicable. A directive or an ECSC recommendation is binding
as to its result on each member state. The ECSC recommendation can also be binding
upon citizens of the common market. Decisions are directed exclusively at individuals
and are binding in entirety and directly applicable. EEC and Euratom recommendations
as well as opinions are not binding, and therefore confer no legal rights or obligations
to addresses. Recommendations are initiated by an EC institution, where as opinions
are initiated by outside parties. See THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S LEGAL SYSTEM, supra
note 29, at 17-22.
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dures for individual state energy programs, leaving specific rule
making and enforcement to the state.
1. Targeting and Other Goal Articulation
The following enactments are principal examples of legisla-
tion by the Community which enunciate non-binding goals for
energy use or production by the member states. Council reso-
lution of February 13, 1975, discusses measures to be implemented
to achieve the community energy policy objectives adopted by
the Council on December 17, 1974. In this resolution, Council
directs the Commission to set periodic, long-term energy guide-
lines to pursue these objectives and to set targets in individual
energy sectors. These targets are to ensure economical and energy
supplies and provide for research and development programs.
Another council decision describes community targets for re-
ductions in consumption of energy in the event of difficulties in
the supply of crude oil.80 Other Council resolutions set short
term targets for the reduction of oil consumption and imports
and for energy saving in the member states. 8
The EC Council also has passed many recommendations on
conservation and efficient use of energy. These recommendations
require rational use of energy in heating systems of existing
buildings,82 in space heating and in the production of domestic
hot water and heat in new buildings,83 in electrical household
appliances,8 4 and in industrial enterprises.83 Recommendations
1 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 292) 9 (1977) (Council Decision 77/706/EEC of
Nov. 6, 1977).
" 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 153) 6 (1975) (Council Resolution of June 26,
1975); 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 289) 1 (1975) (Council Resolution of Dec. 9, 1975).
11 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 140) 12 (1976) (Council Recommendation 76/493/
EEC of May 4, 1976).
11 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 295) 1 (1977) (Council Recommendation 77/712/
EEC of Oct. 25, 1977); O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 52) 32 (1978) (Council Directive 78/
170/EEC of Feb. 13, 1978).
"' 19 0.3. EuR. COMM. (No. L 140) 18 (1976) (Council Recommendation 76/496/
EEC of May 4, 1976).
11 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 295) 3 (1977) (Council Recommendation 77/713/
EEC of Oct. 25, 1977).
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also urge rational use of energy by road vehicles through better
driving habits8 6 and in urban passenger transport. 7
2. Monitoring and Other Information Gathering
Gathering information about a member state's activities in
regard to energy consumption, production, importation/expor-
tation, and investment serves a number of purposes. First, the pres-
sure of opinion by a state's own public and by other Community
members may tend to enforce the EC's otherwise non-obligatory
energy goals, if the monitoring reveals an unsatisfactory effort
by a particular government. Second, full information makes a
market more transparent, increasing the efficiency by which
resources are allocated. Perhaps more importantly in terms of
the Community's energy objectives, market transparency may
help avoid a short term crisis. Panic buying and skyrocketing
prices are sometimes the result of buyers acting out of the fear
of shortages that do not really exist.
Community legislation concerning the monitoring and gath-
ering of information about member states' activities in the energy
area applies to both member states and undertaking therein. In
the area of energy production, a council regulation requires that
member states communicate to the Commission information on
their energy supply situations.8 8 The Commission communication
"on the amended text ... of Decision No. 4-53 on the publi-
cation of price lists and conditions of sale applied by undertak-
ings in the coal and iron ore industries" describes publication
requirements for individual enterprises in the coal industry pur-
suant to the January 1, 1973 amended version of Decision No.
4-53.s9
19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 140) 14 (1976) (Council Recommendation 76/494/
EEC of May 4, 1976).
" 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 140) 16 (1976) (Council Recommendation 76/495/
EEC of May 4, 1976).
" 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 198) 1 (1976) (Council Regulation 1729/76/EEC
of June 21, 1976).
" 16 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 29/28) (1973) (communication of the Commission on
the amended text at present valid of Decision No. 4-53 on the publication of price lists
and conditions of sale applied by undertakings in the coal industries). The existence of
competition and antitrust laws in industrial societies is a recognition of the belief on the
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Other enactments require monitoring of energy imports and
exports. Council regulations establish common rules and sur-
veillance procedures for Community imports and exports. 90 In
the coal sector, a council decision discusses the surveillance of
imports of hard coal to the EC from third countries. 9' According
to requirements elaborated in another council regulation 92 and
its accompanying legislation, 93 member states must notify the
Commission every six months of imports by all undertakings of
member states of crude oil and natural gas for consumption.
Member states must also report expected oil and gas imports for
the coming year. Member states are required to notify the com-
mission of exports of crude oil and gas to third countries.94
These regulations also require that members who plan to export
or import 100,000 metric tons or more per annum of crude oil
or natural gas must notify member states in advance to facilitate
the Commission's monitoring task.
A council regulation requires member states to notify the
Commission of investment projects which would affect the EC
in the petroleum, natural gas and electricity sectors. 95 Legislation
part of legislators, at least, that concerted activity, even when not required by enforceable
rules, does affect markets. It follows that the consultations and exhortations associated
with EC energy policy could have significant market impacts (such as the intended
decrease in energy demand or increase in energy supplies) even when the policy lacked
enforcement mechanisms. There is little reason to believe in the effectiveness of unwanted
collusion prohibited by antitrust policy while denying the possible effectiveness of desired
collusion by energy consumers.
o 17 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 159) 1 (1974) (Council Regulation 1439/74/EEC
of June 4, 1974); 12 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 324) 25 (1969) (Council Regulation 2603/
69/EEC of Dec. 20, 1969).
1, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 292) 11 (1977) (Council Decision 77/707/ECSC of
Nov. 7, 1977).
91 15 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 120) 3 (1972) (Council Regulation 1055/72/EEC
of May 18, 1972).
11 16 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 113) 1 (1973) (Commission Regulation 1068/73/EEC
of Mar. 16, 1972); 17 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 349) 1 (1974) (Council Regulation 3254/
74/EEC of Dec. 17, 1974); 18 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 275) 1 (1975) (Commission Regulation
2677/75/EEC of Oct. 6, 1975).
" 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 45) 1 (1975) (Council Regulation 338/75/EEC of
Feb. 13, 1975); 18 O.J. EUR. Comm. (No. L 275) 8 (1975) (Commission Regulation 2678/
75/EEC of Oct. 6, 1975).
11 15 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 120) 7 (1972) (Council Regulation 1056/72/EEC
of May 18, 1972); 16 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 113) 14 (1973) (Commission Regulation
1069/73/EEC of Mar. 16, 1973); 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 140) 1 (1976) (Council
Regulation 1215/76/EEC of May 4, 1976); 20 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 358) 12 (1977)
(Commission Regulation 3025/77/EEC of Dec. 23, 1977).
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also requires the exchange of information on investment projects
and on the siting of power stations in the nuclear energy sector.
96
3. Mandatory Stockpiles
The notable exception to the Community's failure to man-
date or prohibit any specific actions in regard to individual
members' energy policies is the legislation concerning stockpiles.
A council directive imposed an obligation on member states to
maintain stocks of crude oil and/or petroleum products equiv-
alent to at least 65 days of national consumption. 97 This require-
ment was later raised to 90 days. 9 The obvious purpose of such
legislation is to avoid crises and to mitigate those which occur.
During supply shortages, stockpiles can take up some of the
shortfall. Furthermore, exporters who attempt to create short-
ages for whatever political or economic reasons have less leverage
if consumer nations have a supply buffer. Finally, as with the
market information efforts mentioned above, stockpiles may
provide some brake to panic buying. 99 However, as demonstrated
by the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979, stockpile legislation alone
is not enough to ward off crisis.
4. Use of Resources
At first glance, it would appear that the Community had
chosen to regulate the uses to which natural gas and oil could
be used. Council directives "on the restriction of the use of
natural gas in power stations" and "concerning the restriction
of the use of petroleum products in power stations" seem by
their titles to be the legislation.100 However, the regulation in
I See, e.g., I O.J. EuR. COMM. 17/417/58 (1958) (Regulation 4/58/Euratom); I
O.J. EUR. COMM. 25/511/50 (1958) (Regulation 1/58 Euratom); 21 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. C 286) 1 (1978) (Council Resolution of Nov. 20, 1978 concerning the mutual
exchange of information at the community level on the siting of power stations).
9' O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 308) 14 (1968) (Special Ed. 1968 (II)) (Council Directive
68/414/EEC of Dec. 20, 1968).
" O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 291) 154 (1972) (Special Ed. 1972 (Dec. 28-30)) (Council
Directive 72/425/EEC of Dec. 19, 1972).
" See generally supra note 89 and accompanying text.
00 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 178) 24 (1975) (Council Directive 75/404/EEC of
Feb. 13, 1975); 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. 178) 26 (1975) (Council Directive 75/405/
EEC of Apr. 14, 1975).
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question is illusory. EC Directives, by definition, leave enforce-
ment responsibility to the individual member states. Combining
this discretion with the directives' generous exceptions to the
general prohibition against use of oil and gas in power generation
makes for little real Community regulation in this area. Thus, it
cannot be said that the EC has legislated significantly in the area
of resource use.
5. Production Subsidies
Energy-related research and development programs have been
created and funded through EC legislation. Examples are certain
subsidies in the form of matching grants to Britain and Germany
for work related to technological advancements in coal use, such
as fluidized bed combustion or coal liquifiction. 0 However,
these programs have not been large relative to the size of the
total energy market, nor do they seem to have had, as yet, any
significant effect on energy production. Of course, as discussed
in the section of this paper dealing with environmental con-
straints on coal import expansion, some of these projects could
have significance for the future if any breakthroughs are made
which produce a cleaner and more economical way to burn coal.
The chief production subsidies for coal come not through
direct EC action, but through the suspension of EC law. The
legislation allowing this'02 cannot be viewed as part of a common
energy policy, as it really constitutes the rejection of common
market principles and not their implementation.
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EUROPEAN ENERGY
POLICY FOR AMERICAN COAL PRODUCERS
To some extent the reasons generally given in the past for
the depressed state of the coal export market are correct. An
'*1 The legislation authorizing such subsidies is found at 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.
L 177) 7 (1984) (Council Regulation of June 26, 1984 introducing special measures of
Community interest relating to energy strategy). For an example of an approved grant,
see 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L. 283) 48 (1984) (Commission Decision of Oct. 17, 1984
granting financial assistance within the framework of the special energy development
program). For a discussion, including breakdowns, of Community financial support to
the energy sector, see COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, ENERGY IN EUROPE 33-
35 (Apr. 1985) [hereinafter cited as ENERGY IN EUROPE].
"1 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 63) 1 (1976) (Commission Decision on Feb. 25, 1976
regarding the Community system of measures taken by the member states to assist the
coal-mining industry).
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American dollar made artifically strong by United States budget
deficits financed by American borrowing on international mar-
kets at favorable rates certainly makes it more difficult for all
United States companies to sell their goods and services abroad.
The coal industry is, of course, subject to this general problem.
Additionally, the size and unpredictability of American inland
transportation costs, particularly since the recent rail rate dere-
gulation, deters coal sales to Europe. Depressed demand may
also be a relevant factor, though less significant than a few years
ago when both this country and Western Europe were in the
midst of deep recessions. However, these arguments are used to
prove too much. American coal need not be consigned to boom
or bust export cycles with European buyers, being sought in
substantial quantity only when those buyers face a supply or
price crisis in the energy markets, as was the case in 1973-74
and 1979-80. Such will be the case only if American coal pro-
ducers refuse to change their marketing attitudes.
The attitude of American coal producers and brokers has
been: we don't need government participation in marketing, we
don't need export trading companies, and we don't need Webb-
Pomerene associations-just show us the demand, give us the
customers' names and we'll make the deal-if we can't make
the deal, it's because the market isn't there, because of a strong
dollar, high domestic costs, slack demand, etc. 03 This view is
dogmatic and oversimplified. It hurts the American coal indus-
try. It reflects a bias against all forms of economic planning and
a false assumption that individual entrepreneurship is the best
approach to any economic problem. It is a myopic American
view offering a blurred vision of European realities.
Western Europe's energy policy is far from being compre-
hensive, transparent or consistent. This paper's previous sections
analyzing the web of EC regulations, directives, resolutions and
individual national activities demonstrate that proposition. None-
theless, many components of an energy policy for Western Eu-
rope do exist, and more are being planned. Western Europe's
energy market does not and will not resemble a classical free
1*1 Interview with an official of International Trade Administration, United States
Department of Commerce, in Charleston, West Virginia (Nov. 1984) (the view described
in the text was also expressed by the coal industry personnel with whom the author had
communication).
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market for soybeans, hogbellies, or bazaar trinkets. Rather, it is
highly planned and will continue to be so. It does not make
competitive sense to approach such a market as an individual
entrepreneur, hoping to strike a profitable coal deal as the
opportunity occurs. American coal producers will not be com-
peting against other individual businesses for single transactions.
They will be competing against countries, like the Soviet Union,
who want to establish a long-term energy relationship with West-
ern Europe involving, for instance, a multi-billion dollar pipeline
and gas supply arrangement. Like it or not, Europeans find
economic planning highly sensible in certain sectors such as
energy. Americans should adjust to the realities that such plan-
ning creates if they want to sell more coal to Europe.
The fact that the European Community's energy policy is
not fully formulated and that it contains some inconsistencies
should not be a reason for American businesses to underestimate
its importance. On the contrary, the degree to which such policy
is not fully formed leaves room for our own economic interests
to have some favorable input in formulation and implementa-
tion. For example, European energy policy takes an ambivalent
attitude toward imported coal. On the one hand, the Community
has explicitly recognized that increasing imports of solid fuels
and generally substituting such fuels for oil lessen its dependence
on Mideast oil. This independence is the cornerstone of its energy
policy. On the other hand, certain aspects of its policy, such as
subsidizing its domestic coal industries, promoting nuclear power,
fighting air pollution, and contracting for Soviet gas, work against
American coal sales to Europe. To the extent that Americans
can offer a secure, reasonably clean, long-term source of energy
to Europe, the ongoing long term policy choices of European
energy planners might be affected in a way favorable to use of
American coal.
A number of possible routes are available to the American
coal industry for trying to stimulate exports to Europe in a
manner responsive to European policy and regulation. These
routes generally involve more concerted planning than our coal
industry is used to doing. °4
- Although the antitrust law implications of such concerted planning is not ana-
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A. Research and Development
Much has been said in the media about the technology gap,
present and future. The Europeans are worried that they are
falling behind the United States and Japan in this area. A second
issue concerns synthetic fuels. As described above, the EC has
made it part of its energy program to encourage and subsidize
research and development of coal liquifaction and gasification.
A third issue is the environment. While desiring to promote coal
use, the Community is increasingly conscious of the environ-
mental difficulties associated with coal. The threat that acid rain
poses to the Black Forest is a highly publicized example of this
problem. All three of these areas would be fertile ground for
United States-EC cooperation in research and development. Both
sides should recognize the benefits of increased technical and
capital resources. Large scale cooperation in research and devel-
opment in areas such as synfuels and environmentally sound use
of coal could lead the way to commercial sales between the same
partners. These sales could be part of a larger package deal,
whereby research and development projects are directly linked
with supply arrangements for fuel needs flowing from that re-
search and development. Even in the absence of such explicit
linkage, the working relationships developed by United States-
EC cooperation in coal research and development could help
facilitate similar cooperation regarding coal supply. However,
such large scale cooperation is only likely between the United
States and the EC if government and industry in the United
States are willing to treat the coal sector as something other than
an atomized market and to cooperate in export planning and
related projects.
B. Long Term Marketing
Whatever gaps and uncertainties may persist in European
Community energy policy, one theme is clear: the Community
wants to be as independent as possible from Mideast oil. This
lyzed in this paper, the author believes most of the proposed activity to be possible
within the bounds of United States law, especially in light of the Export Trading Company
Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-920, 96 Stat. 1233 (1982) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4003
(1982)).
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can only be achieved by diminishing demand and securing long-
term alternative supplies. Spot sales or short-term contracts for
American coal do not significantly contribute to this goal. Long-
term supply arrangements would. As mentioned earlier, it is not
merely Polish coal and German coal that Americans must com-
pete against, but also French nuclear energy and Soviet gas
pipelines.
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to fully analyze
the legal, economic and political issues raised by the idea of
cooperative long-term export marketing, the identification of a
few options is in order. Within the private sector, more coop-
eration is now legally possible. A pair of American laws, the
Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918105 and the Export Trading Com-
pany Act of 1982,106 allow certain concerted activity for facili-
tating American exports, although such activity might otherwise
run afoul of our antitrust laws. The latter law is broader in the
areas it exempts from antitrust prosecution and less burdensome
in its procedural requirements. 0 7 Thus far, coal producers have
shown little interest in availing themselves of this law for the
purpose of promoting coal sales to Europe. 08 This may be a
mistake. Given the Community's emphasis on long-term supply
assurances, a cooperative marketing proposal combining the re-
sources of many producers and minimizing the risk of disruption
might be very attractive to the Europeans. In a time like the
present when American coal is not usually cost-competitive with
other sources, such supply assurrances might shift the balance
more toward American coal. Furthermore, if the monetary and
economic circumstances change in a way to make United States
products generally more competitive again, such long-term pro-
,01 The Export Trade (Webb-Pomerene) Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat.
1397 (1976) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1982)).
" Export Trading Company Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1233 (1982)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4003 (1982)) [hereinafter cited as ETCA].
I Id.
'01 In 1981, a group of Kentucky coal producers did form a marketing cooperative
known as the Big Sandy Coal Producers' Association (with administrative and logistic
support from the Kentucky Export Resources Authority (KERA)). The cooperative made
no attempt to seek an antitrust exemption under either the Webb-Pomerene or Export
Trading Company Acts. Absent such exemption, such joint marketing would seem to
raise antitrust problems, but apparently no legal challenge was made to the activity.
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posals might compete effectively against some of the most at-
tractive energy options that the Europeans are considering.
Beyond the private sector, there is also room for more ef-
fective matching of American supply potential with European
energy priorities by way of government activity. First of all,
states with important coal industries such as Kentucky, Wyoming
and West Virginia can develop export marketing strategies and
agencies to implement such strategies. Such implementation could
include direct marketing activity as has been done by Big Sandy
Coal Producers' Association and Kentucky Export Resource Au-
thority in Kentucky. 1° 9 Interstate coordination might be helpful
in developing attractive packages for European Community coal
users. Such agencies might also help persuade EC, national and
industry planners in Europe of the stability of the long-term
American coal supply. Such agencies could be formed under the
authority of the Export Trading Company Act, which is not
limited to private businesses.1 10 Second, the federal government,
perhaps through the Energy and Commmerce Departments and
the Ex-Im bank, " ' could play a more direct role in communi-
cating with European decision makers regarding long-term en-
ergy security and the role of American coal supplies therein.
Again, the imprimatur of government might, for the Europeans,
be a significant factor in their energy planning.
- Id.
" The term "export trading company" means a person, partnership, association,
or similar organization, whether operated for profit or as a nonprofit organization,
which does business under the laws of the United States or any State and which is
organized and operated principally for purposes of: (a) exporting goods or services
produced in the United States; or (b) facilitating the exploration of goods or services pro-
duced in the United States by unaffiliated persons by providing one or more export trade
services. ETCA, supra note 106, § 4002(a)(4).
'" The Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank) of the United States is a U.S. agency
which provides loans to foreign countries so that they can buy U.S. goods. The Ex-IM
Bank was set up in 1934 to provide a variety of credit programs to aid U.S. exports.
The Bank can offer loans for as much as 90G7o of the value of the goods exported.
However, it prefers participation by private lending institutions so that its loan share is
limited to 45-500 of the value of the goods. Other US agencies, such as the Federal
Credit Insurance Association, the overseas Private Investment Corporation, Cooperative
Financing Facility, Commodity Credit Corporation, Private Export Funding Corpora-
tion, and the Agency for International Development also provide export credit. See J.
JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 60 (1982).
19851
JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW AND POLICY [VOL. 1:173
C. State Aids to the Coal Industry
Obviously, the greater the percentage of European coal con-
sumption satisfied by domestic production, the less coal that will
be imported into the community. For this reason, the extent of
state aid to the European coal industry is highly significant in
assessing the prospect for American coal exports to the EC. This
is especially true because much of the Community's coal cannot
be produced at competitive prices. Many of Europe's coal mines
remain open only through state subsidies. There is a certain
irony here, because one of the major provisions of the treaty
creating the European Coal and Steel Community prohibits just
such state aids." 2 The purpose of such prohibition was central
to the formation of the common market: to avoid state subsidies
which distort true production costs and put the aided firms at a
competitive advantage vis-a-vis the unaided firms, allowing fa-
vored treatment to a locally produced commodity, and impeding
interstate trade and a true common market. Nonetheless, the
prohibition against state aids was suspended." 3 This was done
for social more than economic reasons. If all the coal mines that
could not produce at the market price had been allowed to close,
the increase in unemployment would have been severe." 4 Addi-
tionally, an energy security issue was involved. After the 1973
Arab oil embargo, the EC was anxious to achieve as much energy
independence as possible. Keeping its own coal mines open, even
at higher than market cost, was consistent with this strategy.
However, some European energy experts believe that even con-
sidering the social and energy security arguments, some of the
subsidized mines should be closed." 5 They are so uneconomical
that even in another energy crisis, their production costs would
exceed a greatly increased market price. Reopening costs for a
coal mine are usually prohibitive. However, there is an energy
security argument for continuing to operate those mines that
12 THIRTY YEARS OF COMMUNITY LAW, supra note 2, at 361-62.
'" 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 63) 1 (1976).
" Interviews with officials of EC Energy Directorate in Brussels (June 1985)
[hereinafter cited as Interviews]; see also 19 O.J. EUR. Comm. (No. L 63) 2 (1976)
(official recognition of the social impact of mine closings).
"I Interviews, supra note 114.
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have production costs slightly above market, so that the supply
they provide will continue to be available in a crisis.
Determining where to draw the line to cutoff subsidies, if at
all, is difficult. This is a very relevant question at the time of
this writing because the 1975 Community legislation suspending
the state aid prohibition of the ECSC treaty for the coal industry
has recently expired.11 6 Intense debate within EC institutions is
now occurring.1 7 The issue is whether to renew the legislation
as written, allowing the individual member states to continue to
subsidize their coal industries at whatever level they deem ap-
propriate, or to place some limits on these state aids, thereby
forcing the closure of some of the least economical mines. If no
legislative action at all were taken, the state aid prohibition
would automatically be reinstated upon the expiration of the
1975 law. This is not a realistic possibility, however, given the
mammouth consequences of a total withdrawal of state aid.
These consequences can be understood by glancing at the
numbers involved. Such an exercise will also show the oppor-
tunity that will face American coal producers if even a significant
portion of the EC's subsidized capacity is shut down.
The Community produces about 220 million tons of coal per
year.' 8 Approximately 100 million tons of that production is
subsidized."'9 The EC imports about 70 million tons per year. 20
Coal use is expected to rise slightly over the next fifteen years
to between 300 and 350 million tons yearly. 2' In renewing the
state aids legislation discussed above, some EC energy experts
feel that a cutback of about 40 million tons of subsidized pro-
duction per year should be mandated. 22 Such a combination of
" 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 63) 10 (1976) (the official expiration date was Dec.
31, 1985).
"7 Interviews, supra note 114.
"I Id.; see also ENERGY IN EUROPE, supra note 101, at 15, 18.
"9 Interviews, supra note 114.
'I Id.; see also ENERGY IN EUROPE, supra note 101, at 15, 18.
2 Interviews, supra note 114; see also COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
ENERGY 2000 68 (Commission working paper Feb. 28, 1985) [hereinafter cited as ENERGY
20001.
,22 Interviews, supra note 114. "[O]f the Community's total production some 50 to
60 million tonnes (20 to 257o) are profitable, some 140-150 million tonnes (60 to 65%)
are not profitable under present market conditions and about 40 million tonnes (15%)
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diminished production and expanded consumption would require
an approximate doubling of coal imports, opening the possibility
of tens of millions of tons of new sales for Americans, among
others. 123 However, even such a partial cutback on subsidies is
estimated to cost about 100,000 jobs in Europe. 2 4 Thus, such a
limitation on state aids is highly controversial and problematic.
D. Environmental Constraints
Environmental problems may be the greatest obstacle to a
significant expansion in the role of coal in EC energy production.
This was the view expressed by EC energy experts in discussions
with the author.
125
The acid rain issue has recently been receiving much attention
in Europe, especially in Germany. The famous Black Forest has
already suffered severe damage. 2 6 Intense debate also raged
within the Community this year over exhaust emissions from
automobiles.' 27 The Community trails the United States by at
least a decade in setting strict standards to fight air pollution.
Anyone who has been on a London street recently and breathed
the fumes can testify to that. A similarity that the EC does bear
to the United States, however, is the regional haggling that
cannot be produced competitively at all". OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE ENERGY PROBLEM 40
(Periodical No. 1, 1983) [hereinafter cited as THE ENERGY PROBLEM].
"I Interviews, supra note 114; see also ENERGY 2000, supra note 122, at 1 24-26,
68; ENERGY IN EUROPE, supra note 101, at 20-21.
,14 Interviews, supra note 114.
125 Id.
,2 Acid rain is a phenomenon caused by the combustion of fossil fuels. Sulfur Dioxide
(SO 2 ) and Nitrogen Oxides (NO,), released into the atmosphere through coal and oil com-
bustion, chemically transform into acids and return to earth by way of precipitation.
Until 1982, West Germany actively opposed any form of acid rain prevention
legislation. In that year a government report concluded that over 14 million acres of
German forests had suffered severe air pollution damage. West Germany is currently a
leading advocate of stringent acid rain prevention.
See Wetstone & Rosencranz, Transboundary Air Pollution in Europe: A Survey
of National Responses, 9 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1983); Wetstone, Acid Rain: The
International Perspective, I 1 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 31 (1983) (discussion of the European
acid rain problem).
2 Dryden, EC Exhaust Rules Upset Ecologists, Automakers, International Herald
Tribune, July 22, 1985, at 2, col. I.
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characterizes the debate over air pollution. European pollution
tends to travel from west to east, as it does in the United States.
Just as New York and New England would like regulation that
prevents Ohio and West Virginia from sending sulfur dioxide
and nitrous oxides their way, Germany advocates EC legislation
to limit Britain's production to transboundary pollutants. Britain
and Ohio both would like to continue running their power plants
with tall stacks reducing the concentration of pollution in the
proximity of the plants, but dispersing it eastward in the upper
atmosphere. There are also regional conflicts in the EC concern-
ing auto emissions, with states whose auto industries would
suffer from new requirements confronting states more concerned
about their deteriorating air and water-another similarity to the
United States. 28
Given this conflict, it is difficult to predict the type of mix
of environmental controls that will ultimately be legislated by
the Community. However, given the growing public debate con-
cerning environmental deterioration in Europe, it seems likely
that some collection of more stringent controls will be the result.
The EC Commission has recognized the potential effects of such
controls on coal consumption.
29
The Commission's present proposals on tightening-up at-
mospheric emission controls on large industrial plants could in-
fluence the coal and oil markets in the future. However, there
is a degree of uncertainty as to the way in which the Member
States could apply the proposed standards if they were adopted.
Different means could be employed by industrial concerns and
electricity undertakings to respond to this need including: (1)
replacing the fuel used by another, less polluting one (natural
gas could become attractive in this case); (2) turning to coal
with low sulphur content, involving a cost increase of from 4
to 8%; and (3) installing desulphurization units, the investment
cost of which can vary, depending on the size of installation,
from $90 to $200/kwe.'30 A combination of these various means
2 Id. Auto emissions are a major source of NO, as well as carbon monoxide.
hydrocarbons, and lead. West Germany again is at the forefront for stringent auto
emission control, finding support from both the Netherlands and Denmark, but heavy
resistance from fellow automakers Italy, France, and Britain.
I29 ENERGY 2000, supra note 121, at 1 69.
130 Id.
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would not lead to any appreciable change in gross energy con-
sumption in 2000, but would result in extensive substitutions
of one energy product for another.
In the electricity sector, stricter emission controls on conven-
tional power stations will probably lead to increased production
costs, varying according to country between 8 and 12%. In this
case, overall final electricity demand could drop 3 to 4% by the
year 2000, probably being replaced by natural gas. As far as
electricity production itself is concerned, there could be some
substitutions of nuclear energy for coal at the base of the load
curve, while marginal quantities of coal and fuel oil could be
replaced by natural gas in the middle of the curve.' 3'
In the same context, gas would also increase its market share
in industry at the expense of coal and oil. The final result of
this would be a level of coal consumption in 2000 close to 225
millions of tons of oil equivalent (mtoe) instead of the 265 mtoe
arrived at in the reference projection. Oil consumption would also
drop by some 10 mtoe in favor of natural gas and nuclear energy,
which would each increase their respective market shares to much
the same extent.'
32
In a May, 1985 Commission document entitled "New Com-
munity Energy Objectives," the Commission recognized the
necessary integration of EC environmental and energy policies. 33
It proposed as one of the Community's energy objectives "the
balanced pursuit of both energy and environmental aims, partic-
ularly through the use of best available and cost-effective control
technologies and through improvements in energy efficiency." 3,
In the same section of the report, the Commission mentioned
nuclear power and natural gas as environmentally clean alter-
natives to polluting fuels and encouraged their use. 3 In this
political environment, it is clear that coal's chances of gaining
" ENERGY 2000, supra note 121, at 69.
132 Id.
"I Environment: "The Community's third action program on the environment
stresses that the environmental dimension should be integrated in other policy sectors.
This integration is especially important in the energy field." COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES, NEW COMMUNITY ENERGY OBJECTIVES 44 (May 1985).
Id. at 21.
"' "Some energy policy aims are clearly favorable in environmental terms. For
instance, energy conservation, the increased use of natural gas and the further devel-
opment of safe nuclear production will all make a substantial contribution to reducing
emissions of pollutants, thus furthering the Community's objectives in both the energy
and environmental fields." Id.; see also ENERGY 2000, supra note 121, at 1 46.
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an increased share of the energy market in Europe are dependent
on developing those "cost-effective control technologies" spoken
of by the Commission. The American coal industry might have
a potential foot in the door, given the research and development
that is presently progressing on this side of the Atlantic. 3 6 Com-
bined sales and technology packages are worth considering in
this context.
E. Competition from Natural Gas
At first glance it might appear that EC energy policy favors
the use of coal over natural gas. Indeed, a council directive,
which restricted use of natural gas in power stations, seemed to
show a community desire to increase the use of coal at the
expense of natural gas. It also seemed to imply that for future
purposes, natural gas and coal would not be in competition for
the same market. These observations are only partially true.
The directive itself does not prohibit anything effectively. As
is the case with all EEC directives, it states purportedly man-
datory goals, but leaves to the discretion of each member state
the means of enforcing these goals. In this case, even the goal
of replacing (or pre-empting) natural gas use in power stations
is significantly qualified. If, in the discretion of the individual
state, technical, economic, or environmental reasons make the
use of natural gas in power stations desirable, such use may be
authorized. The climate surrounding the issues relevant to such
discretionary decisions has changed sufficiently since the direc-
tive's passage in early 1975 to dampen the impact of the directive
to the disadvantage of coal.
One reason is that the market has changed significantly. Not
only is there a general energy surplus in the world today, but
much more natural gas is available to Europe. Rather than the
Netherlands being the only major reliable gas supplier to the
EC, as was the case in 1975, abundant gas is now offered by
the Soviet Union, Norway, Algeria, and the Netherlands.' 37 Even
Diamond, Major Advances In Energy: How to Burn Coal - Cleanly, Interna-
tional Herald Tribune, June 28, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
' The Netherlands, the U.S.S.R., Norway, and Algeria were the four principal
sellers of natural gas in Western Europe in 1982, accounting for 95% of the total traded.
U. STERN, INTERNATIONAL GAS TAnDE IN EUROPE 189 (1984).
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more important for the future, natural gas is a clean-burning
fuel, with few of the environmental shortcomings associated with
coal. This fact could have a negative impact on the market for
coal in two ways. First, nations trying to improve their air
quality without investment in expensive control technologies might
take advantage of the environmental exception within the natural
gas directive and continue to burn gas for power generation.
This will be an especially attractive option if increasing supplies
of gas cause prices to fall. Second, even if gas is phased out of
power production, as envisioned by the directive, it will none-
theless compete indirectly with coal to the extent that it, rather
than electricity, is used in home heating and cooking.
Thus, to minimize the effects of competition from gas, the
coal industry again is faced with the two challenges previously
discussed: it must develop commercially attractive pollution con-
trol technologies and it must make available the kind of long-
term supply assurrances offered in the natural gas market.
F. The Electricity Sector and Competition from Nuclear Energy
The Commission's proposed energy objective for electricity
1995 is "Continued priority for the use of solid fuels and
nuclear energy in the electricity sector to ensure that not more
than 10% of electricity is generated from hydrocarbons [oil and
gas] in 1995."' 38 Approximately 40% of electricity output in
1995 is to be generated from nuclear power.' 39 This objective
highlights the somewhat ambiguous potential for the growth of
coal consumption as a result of conscious EC energy policy. It
is Community policy to promote the use of electricity in industry,
especially as a substitute for oil or gas.' 41 Within the electricity
sector, Community policy is to discourage the use of oil and gas
" NEW COMMUNITY ENERGY OBJECTIVES, supra note 131, at 34.
139 Id.
"O COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, REVIEW OF MEMBER STATES' ENERGY
POLICIES J 45-48 (Feb. 1984) [hereinafter cited as REvIw].
Tension exists in the debate as to the most environmentally sound alternative to
hydrocarbons: coal or nuclear? The impact of coal use is quantifiable in terms of air
pollution and its negative effects, and the cost of pollution prevention and clean-up.
Nuclear power's adverse consequences are viewed primarily as "risks", and through the
risk may be great, actual impact for both present and future is only speculative. See
generally THE ENERGY PROBLEM, supra note 122, at 43-45.
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in power generation.'" Therefore, Community policy also en-
courages the use of coal and nuclear fuel in such power gener-
ation. However, in the choice as to whether coal or nuclear
power is the preferable substitute, EC policy is not at all clear.
If anything, the language of the objective might imply a slight
preference for nuclear power over coal, but that certainly is not
explicit." 2
The historic evidence shows the nuclear industry doing much
better than the coal industry in taking advantage of European
efforts since the 1973 oil crisis to wean the Community off its
thirst for imported oil. Between 1973 and 1983, the EC experi-
enced a 25% increase in electricity demand, although total energy
consumption in the Community decreased by over 6% and oil
use to generate electricity was approximately cut in half."3 Coal
did share in this increased electricity consumption, with a 32%
increase in solid fuel use for electricity generation.' However,
nuclear power fared even better with a fourfold increase in pro-
duction during that period. ,'5 Despite the growth in solid fuel con-
sumption for power generation, total solid fuel consumption fell
slightly between 1973 and 1983,', presumably mostly due to
reduced metallurgical demand.
Certainly, percentages alone may be misleading. Since the
nuclear industry was still getting started commercially in 1973,
its percentage growth in the decade following would be expected
to exceed that of competing fuels. Even considering that factor,
it appears that coal is not competing well against nuclear power.
In its predictions for 1995 and 2000, the EC sees nuclear energy
' NEW COMMUNITY ENERGY OBJECTIVES, supra note 131, at 34.
142 Id.
1' REVIEW, supra note 138, at 8.
144 Id.
14 Id.
,,6 "Consumption of solid fuels in the Community fell slightly between 1973 and
1983. Coal production fell by about 16% and coal imports doubled to account for 20%
of coal consumption. The Energy 2000 study shows that there is potential for increasing
the consumption of solid fuels in the rest of this century. The wider use of coal, and
of lignite and peat in certain countries, would benefit the Community's energy strategy
in terms of diversification and restraint of oil imports. In addition to the role of
Community production, freedom of access for imported coal will be important in this
context. Following an earlier IEA Commitment to promote free trade in coal, member
states and other industrialized countries undertook in the May 1983 OECD Ministerial
meeting to remove impediments to energy trade." Id. 73.
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continuing to take the lion's share of the substitution for oil,
with coal retaining its percentage share of the market, but not
growing. 14
There may be various factors creating such an expectation.
One is certainly the French nuclear program. At the time of the
1973 oil crisis, the French government made a policy decision to
use nuclear power as the prime supply side tool to decrease its
huge dependence on foreign oil. On the demand side, it instituted
what has been a very successful program to increase energy
efficiency and conservation. The French nuclear program has
been the most successful in the world in terms of producing new
energy, and its expansion is expected to continue.'14  In fact,
France is expected to become an exporter of nuclear-generated
electricity to other European countries. With small and dwin-
dling coal reserves, significant uranium resources under their
control, and no domestic oil to speak of, the French decision to
put most of their chips on the nuclear option was perhaps
understandable. However, how the nuclear versus coal picture
is painted in the rest of the EC, (soon to include Spain and
Portugal, both of whom take the coal option very seriously, as
well as the present ten members), may depend on a second factor
which, in addition to the growth of the French nuclear program,
is a cause for such modest EC projection of future coal use.
That factor is the environment. Until commercially attractive
means of using coal in an environmentally acceptable way are
developed, its chances of competing successfully with nuclear
power are relatively diminished. This assumes that environmental
questions about nuclear energy itself do not become impediments
to its use. EC policy makers seem to hold this assumption.'
4 9
"' "Nuclear energy is likely to be the only energy source whose production level
will increase significantly in the Community by 2000. According to the reference projec-
tion, production of solid fuels should remain statis at around the 1983 level. Production
of oil and natural gas should decline gradually on the basis of fields being exploited and
those likely to come into production." ENERGY 2000, supra note 121, at 24.
i,1 In 1984 France accounted for 530 of the total Community nuclear-generated elec-
tricity. Its objectives for 1990 include supplying 88% of French domestic demand. R.Evmw,
supra note 138, at 34, 97-98, see also ENERGY IN EUROPE, supra note 101, at 20 (for a
note on nuclear growth in Europe).
'" THE ENERGY PROBLEM, supra note 122, at 42-45.
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Conclusion
The European Economic Community has been generally suc-
cessful in meeting its energy goals for 1985. Its primary objective
of reducing dependence on foreign oil, articulated more than a
decade ago, has been met. But whether this success is attributable
to that policy or only incidental to it is a matter for debate. In
fact, the very existence of a true energy policy may be a matter
for some debate.
The reason for this seemingly contradictory state of affairs-
the success of a policy that some say does not exist-is that the
same forces that precipitated formation of community energy
objectives also precipiated individual action by European na-
tions. After the 1973 oil boycott, attempts to develop alternative
supplies (such as natural gas, coal and nuclear) and attempts to
use energy more efficiently would certainly have occurred even
if the European community had not articulated energy objec-
tives. The extent to which the Community's general objectives,
targets in specific sectors, and a handful of mandatory regula-
tions facilitated this process is a matter for speculation.
Taken as a whole, however, the national and Community
energy policies in Europe can be seen in concrete terms, although
we are not always able to discern where national policy ends
and Community policy begins. There is a clear mandate, being
followed successfully, to decrease dependence on Mideast oil.
This has included and will continue to include conservation and
efficiency measures. On the supply side, there is a policy en-
couraging long term security. This means increased production
of European petroleum, natural gas agreements with the Soviet
Union and others, a vastly expanded nuclear program, especially
in France, and continued use of solid fuels. Important to the
American coal producer is the extent to which the last category
will be a significant part of the European energy solution.
There seems to be room for increased American coal exports
to Europe within the context of the energy policy followed by
community nations. However, there are two major variables.
One seems to be the environment. The other is European state
subsidies for domestic coal production.
The main limitation on overall expansion of European coal
use seems to be problems associated with air pollution and acid
rain. Europeans would very much like to switch to greater use
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of coal if there were a way to do it cleanly. It is in their interest
to do so because of the needs of their own coal industry. To
the extent that American producers can participate in technolog-
ical solutions to this problem and provide Europe with clean
burning coal or clean burning coal technology, the American
coal industry can share in a tremendous market.
The second major constraint on American coal exports to
Europe is the European Community practice of state subsidies,
contrary to the original provisions of the ECSC. A large per-
centage of European mines cannot produce coal economically at
world market prices, even taking into consideration the large
transportation costs for foreign coal. Even European energy
experts are skeptical about the value of a large portion of the
subsidies, particularly those to the most uneconomical mines,
many of which cannot produce coal for less than $100 per ton.
While it is unrealistic to expect a complete end to such state aid,
even partial elimination of such subsidies would open large
markets for coal imports to Europe. Americans could obviously
share in these markets. This is not simply an internal European
issue. It is as much a free trade issue as discussions about
Japanese import barriers, European steel dumping, and United
States import restrictions proposed against cheap foreign goods.
Consciousness should be raised in this country to make the
health of our coal export industry as much a public issue as the
health of our auto industry, steel industry or agricultural indus-
try. And on this issue, the principle of free trade is on the
American side.
Finally, if the potential for coal imports does expand -
because of a reduction of state aid, environmental solutions to
the pollution problem, and/or economic expansion - American
exporters must be prepared to take advantage of such a situation.
They will be competing with exporters of coal from Poland,
Australia, South Africa, and Columbia. This means American
producers must consider ways to offer attractive long-term mar-
keting arrangements, including joint marketing arrangements. It
also means that United States inland transportation costs, spe-
cifically increasing rail rates, must be brought under control.
Otherwise our coal will not be priced competitively with that
of other exporters.
Thus, there is a real potential under evolving European en-
ergy policy for significant expansion of American coal imports
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to that continent. This potential, however, can only be realized
if the factors discussed above are consciously and intelligently
dealt with by American policy makers in government and in
industry.

